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Are humans too generous and too punitive? Many researchers have concluded that
classic theories of social evolution (e.g., direct reciprocity, reputation) are not sufficient to
explain human cooperation; instead, group selection theories are needed. We think such
a move is premature. The leap to these models has been made by moving directly from
thinking about selection pressures to predicting patterns of behavior and ignoring the
intervening layer of evolved psychology that must mediate this connection. In real world
environments, information processing is a non-trivial problem and details of the ecology
can dramatically constrain potential solutions, often enabling particular heuristics to be
efficient and effective. We argue that making the intervening layer of psychology explicit
resolves decades-old mysteries in the evolution of cooperation and punishment.
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Humans are remarkably social. We build societies of millions, cooperate in groups of all kinds, and
trust even perfect strangers. This is far from the first paper to begin with this premise: these abilities
have captured interest throughout the sciences because they are central to the functioning of society
and are in many ways unique to humans. To unpack the psychology underlying these phenomena,
many researchers have used evolutionary theory to generate predictions about behavior. But
researchers remain divided on what theories are actually needed to explain observed behavior.
Here we review two lines of research illustrating how psychological insights can help arbitrate these
disputes about human social evolution.
WHAT THEORIES DO WE NEED TO EXPLAIN HUMAN
COOPERATION?
For decades, psychologists and other behavioral researchers have used a suite of well-understood
theories from evolutionary biology to map human psychology. To understand the logic of families,
parents, and siblings, evolutionary biologists developed kin selection theory (aka inclusive fitness
theory), a formal, mathematical theory describing under what circumstances an animal should
pay a personal cost to provide benefits to another animal, depending on how closely they are
genetically related (Hamilton, 1964). Psychologists have borrowed this theory and applied it to
humans, testing whether and how human psychology is sensitive to cues of relatedness (DeBruine,
2002; Lieberman et al., 2007). To understand trade, exchange, and other acts of cooperation,
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evolutionary biologists developed the theory of direct reciprocity,
a formal theory describing how animals should trade benefits for
mutual gain over time based on, among other things, how long
the relationship will last (Trivers, 1971). Borrowing this theory,
psychologists have tested under what conditions humans will
reciprocate (Cosmides and Tooby, 2005). Evolutionary biology
has also developed theories about reputation and gossip: indirect
reciprocity and biological markets are formal theories describing
how animals should behave given that reputations exist (Noë and
Hammerstein, 1995; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Barclay, 2013).
Nonetheless, there has been strenuous disagreement about
how to interpret behavioral data on human cooperation. In
particular, researchers have questioned whether humans are
more generous and more punitive than predicted by the
classic theories outlined above. If so, then different theories,
like genetic or cultural group selection, are needed. We do
not think that such a move is necessary; instead, we think
that the classic theories suffice to explain known behavior. In
brief, our argument is that, in the domain of cooperation,
researchers have too often failed to appreciate the well-known
distinction between the ultimate level of selection pressures
and the proximate, surface level of evolved psychology (for
analyses of this distinction, see Symons, 1992; and Tooby and
Cosmides, 1992). Because of this, the literature on human
social evolution has been dogged by mysterious gulfs between
theoretical prediction and empirical evidence where none should
exist.
Why should thinking in terms of proximate psychology be
able to help in this way? Because theories of social evolution
are theories of psychology—what else is social evolution but
the evolution of psychological mechanisms for sociality? And if
interpretations of data do not accurately take into account how
real minds, operating in real time, with imperfect information,
actually function, then claims that classic theories are not
sufficient may be unwarranted. So, are humans too generous and
too punitive?
ARE HUMANS TOO GENEROUS?
For decades, evolutionary thinkers have been puzzled by
humans’ “irrational” generosity. We often are nice to perfect
strangers—people who are not kin and who we will never
see again. In the real world this would include tipping at
a restaurant when traveling abroad to a place you never
plan to visit again. Why tip? It is not legally required. You
and the waiter are not close kin. You will never see him
again, so reciprocity is impossible. And because no one you
know is around, your reputation is safe. No standard theory
of social evolution seems to apply, but many of us tip
nonetheless.
Similar results occur in the lab. Consider the economic
dictator game: two strangers interact anonymously and just once.
One person, the dictator, unilaterally divides a stake of real money
between herself and the other person. They are not close kin. They
interact only once, so there is no potential for reciprocity. And the
interaction is anonymous, so there is no potential for cultivating
a reputation. Yet just as you were willing to tip, dictators are often
generous (Camerer, 2003).
Because standard theories of social evolution appear ruled out,
but cooperative behavior remains, theorists from evolutionary
anthropology, biology, and economics developed new theories
of human evolution based on genetic or cultural group
selection frameworks (Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Henrich, 2003;
Henrich, 2004). These theories require that much of human
cooperation is a product of culturally specific norms and
imply that generosity and cooperation are not universal
features of human nature (Richerson et al., 2016). These
evolutionary theories have recently found their way into
prominent theories of psychology (Haidt, 2012). However,
whereas theories of kin selection, reciprocity, and reputation are
well-understood and have countless empirical successes (Buss,
2005), theories of group selection are theoretically controversial
(West et al., 2007) and it is not clear they have ever made
unique, empirically confirmed predictions (Krasnow and Delton,
2016).
We think the mystery can instead be parsimoniously
solved by distinguishing the surface logic of the proximate
psychology from the deep logic of the ultimate selection
pressures that created this psychology. While biological theory
provides tools for understanding the latter, psychology is best
positioned to make sense of the former. For instance, the
psychology of sexual attraction evolved to find reproductively
viable partners; that is its deep logic. But the surface logic
of the proximate psychology can only use information that
was reliably available in the human ancestral past, such as
age, health, and other physical appearance cues. This explains
what might otherwise be puzzling: why are men attracted
to women on birth-control—women who are not presently
reproductively viable? The answer is that contraception is a
modern invention; men’s proximate psychology was not designed
for a world where such technology was available. Similarly,
the deep logic of many of our food preferences is to find
calorie-dense food. Because these were scarce ancestrally, our
proximate psychology causes us to eat far more than necessary,
contributing to the modern obesity epidemic. Our work applies
this approach to the study of social behavior, asking: “What
should a proximate psychology for, e.g., direct reciprocity look
like?”
Our analysis starts with two assumptions. First, we assume
that, through individual selection for direct reciprocity, humans
have an evolved psychology for reciprocity and exchange
(Cosmides and Tooby, 2005; see Nowak, 2006 on how
reciprocity can robustly evolve); this is an assumption made
even by proponents of group selection (see Fehr and Henrich,
2003 p. 61; Gintis et al., 2003 p. 155). Second, we assume
uncertainty: real-world decisions are always made with imperfect,
noisy information. The mind’s decision-making processes
must necessarily reflect this uncertainty. In cooperation, this
uncertainty is rampant: is your behavior private or observed?
Would you gain from the trade or not? Is the person you meet
now someone you will see again? Even if cooperation would
pay for both parties, formal models predict that if you know for
certain the relationship is one-shot (that is, you interact once and
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only once) then you should never cooperate; if the relationship is
certainly repeated, however, you should cooperate (Trivers, 1971;
Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). But of course you can almost never
know this with certainty.
More critically, uncertainty entails errors, the costs of which
may not be equal (Haselton and Buss, 2000; Yamagishi et al., 2007;
for a discussion of this in biology, see Johnson et al., 2013). There
are two possible errors here: cooperating when you will actually
interact with your partner only briefly, and defecting when you
will actually see your partner many times. The costs are not equal.
If you erroneously cooperate, you have given up a little for no
gain. But if you erroneously defect, you might miss out on a
life-long, mutually beneficial relationship. Given this asymmetry,
evolution should create human minds biased to cooperate, even
if cooperation does not seem rationally warranted—you seldom
know for sure you won’t see someone again, so play it safe and
cooperate.
And that is exactly what we found: in agent-based simulations
of a human-like ecology, natural selection favored agents
willing to cooperate even with partners they would never
see again (Delton et al., 2011b). This was true over the
vast majority of parameter combinations we tested, involving
many variations of the costs and benefits of cooperation,
lengths of interactions if they are repeated, and the a priori
probabilities of interactions being repeated or one-shot. Notably,
the (very small) parameter space where cooperation in one-
shot encounters did not evolve was largely the same as
the parameter space that did not favor cooperation even
in repeated interactions. When cooperation pays in repeated
interactions, it pays in situations that are likely to be one-shot as
well.
Our simulation therefore provides a straightforward
explanation for “irrational” generosity, without invoking group
selection—as no group selection was possible in this simulation
yet one-shot generosity evolved nonetheless. Moreover, our
simulation ignored the possibility that others could learn of
agents’ behavior; had it been possible for reputations to spread
beyond the dyad, the results would only have been stronger.
By distinguishing the proximate psychology from the ultimate
selection pressures, this research illustrates one way the ruthless
process of natural selection can craft psychologies that are
generous, cooperative and trusting (see also Krasnow et al., 2013;
for allied approaches see Barclay, 2011; Krupp and Taylor, 2015).
Whenever the best response is determined by a noisy cue
and the costs of decision errors are asymmetrical, the proximate
psychology should be designed to avoid making the costly error
(here, defecting in a repeated relationship) at the expense of
making lots of cheap errors (lots of “irrational” generosity).
Although evolutionary theorists have long used decision-making
tools to understand behavior (e.g., Giraldeau, 1997; Sherman
et al., 1997), this approach had not been extended to the
long standing problem of one-shot cooperation. By using a
psychology-inspired approach to decision making, we were able
to develop a new way of looking at an old debate and solve an
enduring mystery (for replies see McNally and Tanner, 2011;
Zefferman, 2014; for rejoinders see Delton et al., 2011a; Delton
and Krasnow, 2014).
ARE HUMANS TOO PUNITIVE?
Punishment is the stick to cooperation’s carrot. Many animals
use punishment to try to change others’ behavior to achieve
beneficial outcomes (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995) and such
theories of punishment-as-bargaining have a long history in the
biological (Hammerstein and Parker, 1982) and social sciences
(Schelling, 1980). This is punishment’s deep logic. But, just as
with generosity, when human punishment has been studied,
many researchers have concluded that humans are “irrationally”
punitive—often punishing with no apparent incentive. As with
generosity, these conclusions come largely from studies of
one-shot, anonymous punishment (Fehr et al., 2002). And
again, researchers turned to theories of group selection for
answers (Henrich et al., 2010). But does the puzzle of irrational
punishment even exist? We think the answer again is no.
Punishment in conditions with no rational incentive only violates
the deep logic of punishment. To answer this question about the
surface logic we must ask, “What should a proximate psychology
for punitive bargaining look like?”
The surface logic of our evolved psychology can only
reflect the long-term regularities of our ancestral past.
A general implication of this is that care must be taken when
interpreting experiments of anonymous punishment (Hagen
and Hammerstein, 2006). Showing that men are still attracted
to women on birth-control—an evolutionarily anomalous
technology—does not imply that this mechanism isn’t an
adaptation for preferring reproductive viability; showing that
punishment still occurs in one-shot anonymous encounters—an
evolutionarily anomalous situation—similarly does not imply
that this mechanism isn’t an adaptation for bargaining for better
treatment.
Instead of simply testing for anonymous punishment, studies
must test the fit between features of our evolved punishment
psychology and ancestral ecological regularities. One such
regularity is that punishment is costly: punishment takes time
and energy, and there is always the possibility of retaliation.
So, punishment should be contingent on ancestral cues of cost
effectiveness: is it easy for me to punish because, for example, I am
physically formidable or socially connected? When the answer
is yes, people are more likely to aggress to get their way (Von
Rueden et al., 2008; Sell et al., 2009). Is this person likely to
offend against me or people I value if I fail to punish them? When
people believe the answer is yes, they are more likely to punish
(Krasnow et al., 2016). Will punishing a particular person give
me a reputation as someone willing to defend his own interests?
If so, people are more likely to punish (Benard, 2013). Is the
person treating me poorly someone who might be valuable for
cooperation in the future? When people intend to cooperate with
someone in the future, they are more likely to punish their bad
behavior in the present (Krasnow et al., 2012).
Punishment has been especially mysterious in groups: even if
punishment is beneficial, why should I bear its costs instead of
leaving them to others in the group (Yamagishi, 1988; Boyd and
Richerson, 1992)? Previous work identified this “second-order
free riding” as a fatal barrier to the evolution of punishment in
groups: punishment benefits the entire group, so why should any
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particular person pay the cost of providing it? Because people
regularly do punish even in sizable groups, many researchers
have concluded group selection is needed. We think this
is premature. We have modeled how a basic psychological
insight solves the problem (Krasnow et al., 2015). People vary
quantitatively in pretty much any psychological trait you can
think of. This should include their punitive tendencies. Yet
past models of group cooperation and punishment restricted
people to distinct types: either you are a punisher or you are
not.
Once we allowed evolution to work on quantitative individual
differences, the problem was solved: evolution easily and
reliably created organisms with some willingness to punish
(including in groups of up to 25, the largest group size
we tested). When everyone in a group is a little willing to
punish, this means that at any given moment, someone will
punish bad behavior. These results obtained under reasonable
ecological assumptions: that punishment recalibrates non-
cooperators to cooperate (preventing re-offense against the
punisher), that life is long enough that this later cooperation
repeats (raising benefits), and that punishment is probabilistic
rather than all-or-none (lowering costs). Importantly, although
the simulation allowed for the possibility of second-order
free riding, agents nonetheless evolved to be punitive and
this punishment sustained cooperation; second-order free
riding was not an impediment to the evolution of group
cooperation here. And all this occurred in a simulation
where group selection was not possible (Krasnow et al.,
2015).
As with generosity, examining the surface logic of our
evolved psychology has helped address a long standing debate
about the evolution of punishment in groups. Basic psychology
helped to solve another decades-long mystery in the biological
sciences.
PSYCHOLOGY AS THE MISSING PIECE
Why did researchers argue for decades that if humans had
adaptations for direct reciprocity they should defect in one-shot,
anonymous experiments? Why did the second-order free-rider
problem appear to be so insurmountable? We argue that this
is the reliable result of failing to properly consider the role
of psychology as the intervening level of analysis between the
evolutionary game theory of the selection pressures and the
behavior that ultimately results from them. By inserting even a
minimally plausible psychology, both mysteries evaporate. While
we focus on research on cooperation and punishment here, this
argument should apply generally. Theories of animal behavior are
theories of psychology. Theoretical biology has had tremendous
success leveraging analyses of the deep logic of selection pressures
into predictions of organismal design. By contrast, especially in
debates on the evolution of human cooperation, less attention
has been paid to the fact that this deep logic must be played out
by a surface logic tuned to the information structure of a species’
ancestral ecology. This is the role of psychology in evolutionary
science. Here we show how off course the science can get when
this old point is not remembered.
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